docs: record v0.5 release validation
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# Validation
## Version 0.5.0 release and security validation, 2026-09-13
Implementation commit: `557ba7cd6982b02754d34fb99cba5a116f78f153`, signed by
Nic Weyand. Version 0.5 adds the ROR 2.1 adapter, source-bound provider checksums,
explicit source lineage, multiline Wikidata dump and JSON-delta replay, compact
runtime generations with authenticated external audit bundles, signed retention
checkpoints, lineage-aware evaluation reports and a bounded benchmark harness.
Writer stores retain schema version 5; source manifests advance to v3 and compact
generation receipts to v3.
Linux x86_64 with Rust/Cargo 1.98.1 and Python 3.14.7 passed:
- Formatting, locked all-target compilation, Clippy with warnings denied, strict
API documentation, all 70 Rust tests and all 10 Python tests.
- Native CLI, reusable Rust and Python consumer parity across the synthetic
fixture, including trust failures.
- Adversarial checks for ZIP member and expanded-size drift, multiline and large
Wikidata records, P856 tombstones, killed and disk-full imports, audit omission
and substitution, compact/full equivalence, receipt selection mismatches,
retention signatures, benchmark output exhaustion and no-clobber publication.
- `cargo audit --deny warnings` scanned 1,243 RustSec advisories across 277 locked
dependency nodes without a finding. The final security review found no unresolved
critical, high or medium issue in its reviewed scope; see
[SECURITY-REVIEW-0.5.md](SECURITY-REVIEW-0.5.md).
Two source packages from the clean implementation commit were byte identical.
Receipt pin:
`51dff46d846bbfe794fb33d507a694ac15fbc899591e5515d33d114db3bee553`.
Archive SHA-256:
`63a0571061385a36197beabadfd4c29e3d15bb5948570bea74b04cfb3f784abc`.
The receipt verifier accepted both copies. The archive was extracted outside the
repository without Git metadata and passed the complete acceptance gate again.
[Hosted Forgejo Actions run 9](https://git.argand.org/nicweyand/argand-site-registry/actions/runs/9)
passed the exact implementation commit on the isolated registry runner. It fetched
the public revision without credentials, ran the offline acceptance gate, compared
and verified two deterministic source packages, extracted one without Git metadata,
and passed the complete gate again from that source tree. The runner has no dataset,
reviewer, signing or activation authority.
A separate real-provider canary used ROR release `v2.12-2026-08-25` from Zenodo
record `22099990` and the same-day Public Suffix List. The 36,246,232-byte ROR ZIP
had SHA-256
`5779c7baf71771fd8ea829201e7bd4343a3c68ff36c595f480b3a00292f78931`
and provider-bound MD5 `ce8807691455d4ada3216c31408e9e1a`. It expanded to
362,619,018 bytes and imported 137,398 records with 914,439 facts in 62.30 seconds,
using 25,032 KiB peak RSS. Exact replay produced zero changes. A deliberately
killed import resumed from its last committed checkpoint and converged on the same
record and fact totals.
The resulting compact registry contained 137,398 entities, 131,591 properties,
133,398 edges and 169 rejected facts. Its generation pin was
`b4f639e3d4f759833914a34aded2389442eeca142952d78fb7f66343f6f4224d`.
The 824,705,024-byte compact database was 38.69% smaller than the full audit-bearing
database. Two compact builds were byte identical. Full verification covered
686,468,048 audit bytes, 137,399 source records and 914,440 facts. A 1,000-case
evaluation produced 1,000 expected safe abstentions with 72 microsecond median and
96 microsecond p95 lookup latency. These single-machine import and warm-read
measurements characterize this release canary, not production serving capacity;
see [BENCHMARKING.md](BENCHMARKING.md).
The final inventory was reviewed for credentials, private paths, datasets,
generated artifacts, unsafe Rust and unrelated changes. Provider data, generated
registries and audit bundles remain outside Git. No production review or signing
key was used, and no Argand source tree, build cache, service or public route was
changed during implementation or validation.
## Version 0.4.0 release and security validation, 2026-09-13
Implementation commit: `e26efc19fa7f73e63cd98cb32b446d1fe10eed40`, signed by