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82 lines
3.8 KiB
Markdown
82 lines
3.8 KiB
Markdown
# Public signed catalog
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The v0.6.2 Forgejo release publishes the current immutable data generation that
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Argand and any other Site Registry consumer can verify and resolve:
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- release: <https://git.argand.org/nicweyand/argand-site-registry/releases/tag/v0.6.2>
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- asset: `argand-site-registry-catalog-v0.6.2.tar.gz`
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- asset SHA-256:
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`48b0cdf453862d858c4bec6c564360e1309605e30af9aba1f54a9446b9bdbe41`
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- generation pin:
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`5e5d8fd5dc1864dc3f4c53ec71cb5ac64f6db592cfbc8cc56f48a444378e2309`
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The release also carries a checksum file and an OpenSSH signature under namespace
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`argand-site-registry-release`. Verify it against
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[`trust/public-catalog-20260920/publisher-allowed-signers`](../trust/public-catalog-20260920/publisher-allowed-signers).
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The signed Git history is the independent channel for the trust root; do not learn
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the only trusted key from the archive it authenticates.
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```bash
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sha256sum --check argand-site-registry-catalog-v0.6.2.tar.gz.sha256
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ssh-keygen -Y verify \
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-f trust/public-catalog-20260920/publisher-allowed-signers \
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-I argand-site-registry-publisher-v1 \
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-n argand-site-registry-release \
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-s argand-site-registry-catalog-v0.6.2.tar.gz.sig \
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< argand-site-registry-catalog-v0.6.2.tar.gz
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```
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After extraction, verify every member with `SHA256SUMS`, then authenticate the
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generation and exact reviewer trust root:
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```bash
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argand-site-registry activate \
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--generation public-release-v0.6.2/catalog \
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--current current.json \
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--allowed-signers trust/public-catalog-20260920/publisher-allowed-signers \
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--allowed-reviewers trust/public-catalog-20260920/reviewer-allowed-signers \
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--identity argand-site-registry-publisher-v1
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argand-site-registry resolve \
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--generation public-release-v0.6.2/catalog \
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--pin 5e5d8fd5dc1864dc3f4c53ec71cb5ac64f6db592cfbc8cc56f48a444378e2309 \
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--query "facebook"
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```
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## Scope and trust
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The v0.6.2 catalog contains 976 entities, 1,062 official-site edges, 20,178
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multilingual name facts, and Common Crawl Web Graph evidence for 840 domains that
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already had imported identity assertions. Graph authority can prioritize review
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and disambiguation, but cannot create an identity, official-site assertion,
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review, vote, or redirect. The archive includes all 33 authenticated cold audit
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objects referenced by the compact runtime generation.
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The bounded Wikidata discovery input is broad but not a representative or
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high-demand sample. Its query and selection metadata are included for audit; raw
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discovery output is never approval.
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The disclosed policy uses one automated evidence-gate reviewer group rather than
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claiming human-review quorum. Fresh exact endpoint observations are required, and
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source conflicts or dangerous drift need two groups, so the single automated
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reviewer must abstain on those risks. Sticky revocations and
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publisher/reviewer-key separation remain enabled.
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Consumers decide whether this policy is appropriate for their use. Preserve typed
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abstentions, retain attribution, and apply independent malware and content policy.
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Do not route to the first raw lookup result. High-risk or disputed catalogs should
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use the unchanged two-human-reviewer reference policy.
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The generation's approvals expire. Installing an immutable archive is not a promise
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that every decision stays valid forever: use the resolver's requested time,
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consume cumulative signed revocation feeds when published, and move to a newly
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signed full generation before relying on renewed decisions.
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## Regular updates
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The public source repository includes the same updater used to refresh candidate
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generations. The example systemd timer runs weekly. It can download, authenticate,
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import and build, but it holds no publisher key and cannot approve, sign or
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activate a candidate. That separation lets any consumer automate evidence updates
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without allowing a compromised downloader or changed upstream dataset to silently
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change redirects.
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